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1. INTRODUCTION  
       After 160 years of colonial settlement, 
Christchurch has recently experienced a 
sequence of devastating earthquakes and seen 
the need for a widespread de- and re-
construction of the central city, as well as, many 
of the surrounding neighbourhoods and peri-
urban satellite settlements. This paper will offer a 
view of the opportunities and restrictions to the 
post-earthquake re-development of Christchurch 
as informed by ‘growth machine’ theory. A case 
study investigating an illegal dump in central 
Christchurch will be used to assess the 
applicability of growth machine theory to the 
current disaster response.  
2. DISASTER RESEARCH 
Disaster research has been traditionally bereft of 
theoretical nous, primarily because research on 
‘natural’ hazards or disasters was often 
undertaken by civil or military organisations that 
were explicitly focused on concrete realities 
rather than theory (Tierney, 2010). More recently 
however, geographical and sociologically 
informed disaster research has flourished (for 
example, see Peacock et al. (1997); Bolin and 
Stanford (1998); Gotham and Greenberg (2008); 
Freudenberg et al. (2010)). Following this trend, 
in 1989, Kathleen Tierney used the ‘growth 
machine’ hypothesis (elaborated in detail below) 
developed in the previous decade by Harvey 
Molotch (1976) to explain why local politicians 
discouraged earthquake mitigation measures, 
such as earthquake retro-fit ordinances, 
improved building standards, and more stringent 
land-use planning, in her local California 
community. Using Tierney’s (1989) research as a  
guide, I propose that the extension of the ‘growth 
machine’ (or as Tierney (see also Pais and Elliott,  
 
2008) referred to it, ‘the recovery machine’) 
theory into analysing disasters – such as 
earthquakes, floods and cyclones – offers a 
geographical explanation of these disasters that 
recognize the structural factors that local 
governance and economic systems play in the 
response and recovery. 
3. GROWTH MACHINE THEORY  
Growth machine theory stems from the research 
of Molotch (1976) and his collaboration with 
Logan (1987). Molotch argued against scholars 
who viewed local governance as the outcome of 
open democratic debate (for example, pluralists 
like Dahl (1961), and Polsby (1960)). Rather, 
Molotch argued that “a city, and more generally, 
any locality, is conceived as the areal expression 
of the interest of some land-based elite. Such an 
elite is seen to profit through the increasing 
intensification of land use of the area in which its 
members hold a common interest (Molotch, 
1976: 309)”. The easiest and most efficient way 
to promote intensification of land use is through 
economic growth, which often expresses itself in 
an increasing and more prosperous population. If 
local elites are able to attract new industries to 
the area – corporate headquarters, government 
offices, educational and research facilities, for 
example – this can lead to an expansion of retail 
and service industries in the locality (Domhoff, 
1986: 57-58). This sequence, according to growth 
machine theorists, is driven by existing land-
owners and local authorities, who themselves are 
in competition with other localities who could 
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subsequently attract the same industries. The 
‘growth machine’ helps explain spatial and social 
environments because, according to Molotch 
(1976: 309), “conditions of community life are 
largely a consequence of the social, economic, 
and political forces embodied in this growth 
machine”. 
 
Five key factors determine the magnitude and 
effectiveness of the growth machine in an urban 
area. The first, as already drawn upon, is that 
individual land-owners and groupings of land 
owners will lobby local government to extract 
gains. At a national level, local government or a 
coalescence of regional and local governments 
may lobby central government for specific 
benefits; for example, business leaders may 
promote specific geographical placing of a 
convention centre so that the surrounding area 
can benefit from the subsequent trade and 
economic stimulus. Secondly, in order to gain 
benefits from authorities, localities are mindful of 
promoting conditions which serve economic 
growth. This good ‘business climate’ could be 
fostered by low taxation or rating on properties; 
flexible labour laws; or the existence of local 
vocational facilities which provide well trained 
employees at no cost to the industry.  
 
Third, the negative externalities of growth must 
be borne by the citizens of these authorities, 
rather than the new businesses who may be 
responsible for this stress on local infrastructure. 
If a new industry begins to pollute the local air, 
anti-smog plans should be paid for by the 
citizens, and not business.  
 
Fourth, those more likely to become involved 
with local politics and decision making are those 
with a greater financial stake in the decisions 
made. For example, businessmen and women, 
property owners and investors in local financial 
institutions often run successfully for local 
government. This creates a clear linkage between 
the real-estate interests who privately benefit 
from economic growth in a locality and the public 
decisions made by the local authorities for the 
good of all citizens. 
 
Lastly, Molotch (1976: 313) concludes by stating 
that these factors all aim “to make the extreme 
statement that this organized effort to affect the 
outcome of growth distribution is the essence of 
local government as a dynamic political force. It is 
not the only function of government, but it is the 
key one and, ironically, the one most ignored”. 
4. GROWTH MACHINE THEORY AND THE 
‘RECOVERY MACHINE’ 
How does the growth machine theory of local 
politics relate to disaster recovery, and in 
particular, recovery in Christchurch city and the 
surrounding localities? Tierney argues that 
mitigation measures to lessen or off-set the 
impact of disasters are rejected by actors 
promoting the growth machine (land owners, real 
estate investors, local authorities, supportive 
citizens) during times of relative stability, 
especially if these mitigation measures are 
viewed as costly economic externalities. She 
argues (1989: 377) that “growth pressures…set 
the stage for future disasters and help to 
undermine mitigation”, because, in her view, 
economic elites and pro-development groups are 
“typically key actors in opposing hazard 
mitigation measures when they are proposed”, 
and that, for example, “unreinforced masonry 
buildings ha[ve] been a major factor impeding 
the adoption of programs to abate the hazards 
associated with those structures, which bring a 
very high rate of return for investors (Tierney 
1989: 378)”.  
 
Mitigation, however, is just one stage of disaster 
management. Drabek (1986a as quoted in 
Tierney, 1989: 267) separates disaster 
management into four stages: mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery. Tierney’s 
research focuses on the reluctance to adopt 
mitigation schemes before natural disasters, 
especially in areas which are known to be prone 
to certain events (for example, California and 
earthquakes). Authors such as Pais and Elliot 
(2008: 1415) have extended ‘growth machine’ 
analysis, arguing that “following…disasters, pro-
growth coalitions take advantage of new sources 
of material and symbolic capital to promote 
further demographic growth”. They refer to this 
as the ‘recovery machine’, and in this preliminary 
analysis, I hope to extend use of this concept to 
provide evidence that the ‘growth machine’ is a 
permanent fixture throughout the four phases of 
disaster management. Furthermore, analysis of 
the ‘growth machine’ during the recovery phase 
will offer insights into the ways that local 
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business and government interests recover from 
devastating disasters. 
 
5. CASE STUDY: SKELLY HOLDINGS AND THE 
SYDENHAM DUMP 
How does the growth machine theory of local 
politics relate to disaster recovery, and in 
particular, recovery in Christchurch city and the 
surrounding localities? Tierney argues that 
mitigation measures to lessen or off-set the 
impact of disasters are rejected by actors 
promoting the growth machine (land owners, real 
estate investors, local authorities, supportive 
citizens) during times of relative stability, 
especially if these mitigation measures are 
viewed as costly economic externalities. She 
argues (1989: 377) that “growth pressures…set 
the stage for future disasters and help to 
undermine mitigation”, because, in her view, 
economic elites and pro-development groups are 
“typically key actors in opposing hazard 
mitigation measures when they are proposed”, 
and that, for example, “unreinforced masonry 
buildings ha[ve] been a major factor impeding 
the adoption of programs to abate the hazards 
associated with those structures, which bring a 
very high rate of return for investors (Tierney 
1989: 378)”.  
 
Mitigation, however, is just one stage of disaster 
management. Drabek (1986a as quoted in 
Tierney, 1989: 267) separates disaster 
management into four stages: mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery. Tierney’s 
research focuses on the reluctance to adopt 
mitigation schemes before natural disasters, 
especially in areas which are known to be prone 
to certain events (for example, California and 
earthquakes). Authors such as Pais and Elliot 
(2008: 1415) have extended ‘growth machine’ 
analysis, arguing that “following…disasters, pro-
growth coalitions take advantage of new sources 
of material and symbolic capital to promote 
further demographic growth”. They refer to this 
as the ‘recovery machine’, and in this preliminary 
analysis, I hope to extend use of this concept to 
provide evidence that the ‘growth machine’ is a 
permanent fixture throughout the four phases of 
disaster management. Furthermore, analysis of 
the ‘growth machine’ during the recovery phase 
will offer insights into the ways that local 
business and government interests recover from 
devastating disasters.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The case of Skelly Holdings central Christchurch 
demolition dump illustrates the morbid 
symptoms that can occur when a city recovers 
from a disaster. The removal of precautionary 
checks and balances to promote speedy recovery 
from disasters, as supported by existing and 
specially created local authorities, are directly 
responsible for these occurrences. If the 
dynamics of local body politics is, however, as 
Molotch (1976: 313) claims, driven by the 
organized effort of a local elite to promote re-
growth, should this outcome be surprising?  
 
Of the five factors of Molotch’s growth machine 
hypothesis, I believe three are illuminated by this 
case study. These are authorities promoting good 
economic conditions; the negative externalities 
of growth borne by the public; and that the 
promotion of growth is the essence of local 
government decision making. The first of these 
factors, I believe, is illustrated by ECan’s Brett 
Aldridge, who was quoted as saying they (ECan) 
were trying to help demolition companies 
operate “rather than weighing in with 
enforcement action as a first step (Sachdeva, 
2011)”, despite the fact that the period for the 
abatement notice on open-air dumping had 
already ceased. Rather than have an illegally 
operating company shut down, or at least pay a 
substantial fine, the authorities decided a hands-
off approach would be best, therefore, keeping 
Skelly’s employees paid (in the short term) and 
allowing demolition companies to dump and 
continue operation there. The negative 
externalities of these decisions – air pollution 
from a dump containing potentially dangerous 
asbestos – was borne by the local businesses and 
residents who were embedded in the area before 
the dump’s existence, and who still operate after 
its abandonment.  
 
Two factors relating to the growth machine could 
not be substantiated by this case study – the 
degree to which Skelly Holdings or other 
demolition companies ‘lobbied’ local authorities 
for lax boundaries, and the extent to which 
decisions were made or influenced by politically 
powerful vested interests. Elite theories of 
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politics often suffer from criticism relating to its 
lack of empirical validity – for instance, it may be 
possible to identify who held power over 
decisions regarding the dump - however, it is far 
more difficult to identify a consensus or unity 
amongst an ’elite’ regarding this case (Horowitz, 
1981: 376-377). Taking this a step further, Dahl 
argues that “I do not see how anyone can 
suppose that he has established the dominance 
of a specific group in a community or nation 
without basing his analysis on a careful 
examination of a series of concrete decisions”.  
 
The last factor - that the promotion of economic 
growth is the essence of local government 
decision making, and thus, is the essence or 
quintessential factor behind the lax enforcement 
of boundaries - is, I believe, evident in this case 
study. A dump was consented to a new company 
run by an overseas citizen with no experience in 
the demolition and dumping of possibly 
dangerous goods. Despite flouting resource 
consents in the most obvious way, the company 
was allowed to persist, as enforcement of 
regulation was seen as being ‘not the first step’.  
 
The growth machine theory may not offer a 
water-tight explanation of political decisions in an 
urban centre recovering from disaster, but it does 
offer a guide and a critical lens to view decisions 
in a manner which highlights the importance of 
capital and investment. Expansion of growth 
machine theory into other aspects of the 
earthquake recovery, such as the central city 
development plan, may offer further helpful 
insight. 
*Nick Kirk is a PhD Candidate at Lincoln 
University, New Zealand. His research focuses on 
fresh-water governance and political power in 
Canterbury. He has previously published articles 
on climate change mitigation, fisheries policy and 
Māori fresh-water management.  
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